This gap in the scholarship reflects a similar gap in our case law. But that is changing. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc addressed this issue of first impression, and by a narrow majority, held that immigration law's "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard is simply another formulation of the intermediate "clear and convincing" standard familiar to civil law. 12 This holding created a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals-the only other circuit court to address this issue-which held in 2013 that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard is a higher standard of proof than the "clear and convincing" standard. 13 In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to resolve this circuit split; therefore, the remaining ten circuit courts must now grapple with this issue individually.
14 Like the scholars who have examined standards of proof, the Ninth Circuit's decision is rooted in the belief that there are only three evidentiary standards; that is, there are only two evidentiary standards in civil proceedings, and one in criminal proceedings. 15 This Article challenges that belief. It argues for the first time in an academic piece that immigration law's "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard is a more stringent standard than the "clear and convincing" standard, and therefore, "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence signifies a third civil standard of proof.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of standards of proof. Part III provides background on the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard in immigration law. It then argues that pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and canons of statutory interpretation, this standard is unequivocally different than the "clear and convincing" standard. In support of this argument, Part IV examines the numerous policy considerations that further show this heightened standard is not only 14. Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016). 15. Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 422 (finding " [t] he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that there are three burdens of proof" and that " [t] hree is enough"). Vol. 66 practical, but it is also necessary to ensure immigration courts reach sound, fair holdings, particularly in cases where one's U.S. citizenship is at stake.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS OF PROOF
This Part begins by explaining the important function standards of proof serve in our judicial system. Next, it examines the three standards of proof courts and scholars most commonly recognize, in addition to noting several less traditional standards of proof factfinders commonly employ. Finally, it summarizes empirical research on whether a standard's formulation impacts the outcome of a case.
A. A Standard's Purpose
Before addressing the standards of proof and the functions they serve, it is important to first distinguish the term "standard of proof" from the broader term, "burden of proof." 16 The burden of proof generally encompasses three components: (1) the burden of production, (2) the burden of persuasion, and (3) the standard of proof. 17 The burden of production identifies which party must go forward with evidence on a particular issue raised in litigation; that is, the burden of production identifies who bears "the obligation to make a prima facie case." 18 The burden of persuasion, by contrast, is the "ultimate obligation on a party to persuade the decision maker that the party should prevail on a contested issue." 19 In civil litigation, the plaintiff usually bears the burden of persuasion and production on all elements of a claim, while the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on all elements of affirmative defenses. 20 While these two components determine which party must go forward with evidence, the standard of proof measures the sufficiency of that evidence. 21 That is, the standard of proof reflects the "degree of certainty required for a judge or jury to find for a party on an issue." 22 Thus, "the term 'standard of proof' specifies how difficult it will be for the party 16 . 2 Charles Tilford McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 675 (7th ed. 2013) (observing that in the family of legal terms, the "slipperiest" member is the term, "burden of proof").
17 bearing the burden of persuasion to convince the jury of the facts in its favor." 23 The standard of proof is the focus of this Article. The standard of proof is a cornerstone of our legal system because of the important functions it serves. 24 For example, in litigation, there is always a risk that the factfinder will reach an incorrect decision; the standard of proof allocates this risk between the parties based on the importance of the rights at stake. 25 Consequently, the greater the value society places on the right at stake, the more stringent the standard of proof. 26 Because the weight society places on the outcome of a particular case varies significantly, the Supreme Court refers to the standard of proof as a "continuum," ranging from low to high probabilities of certainty. 27 A continuum is "a continuous sequence in which adjacent elements are not perceptibly different from each other, [yet] the extremes are quite distinct." 28 The various types of standards of proof are discussed below.
B. The Three Standards
Because the standard of proof often serves to protect litigants' due process rights and other constitutionally protected interests, the Supreme Court has traditionally been the branch to establish which standard of proof is required in a given case. 29 In doing so, the Court has generally recognized three standards of proof. 30 Although the Court has never suggested that factfinders are limited to only those three standards, scholars, and recently the Ninth Circuit, have reached that conclusion. 513, 520 (1958) (observing that "the outcome of a lawsuit-and hence the vindication of legal rights-depends more often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of precedents").
25. 30. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 ("Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law has produced across a continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases.").
31. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
From the lowest to highest degree of probability, these three standards are:
(1) preponderance of the evidence, (2) clear and convincing, and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt.
32
The preponderance of the evidence standard is employed in most civil suits.
33
Under this standard, the plaintiff prevails when its claim is "more likely [true] than not." 34 In quantified terms, a preponderance requires more than a fifty percent probability.
35
This standard allocates the risk of error to both parties in a "roughly [even]" fashion," thereby reflecting society's minimal interest in the outcome of monetary disputes between private parties.
36
On the opposite end of the continuum is the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, which is constitutionally mandated for conviction in criminal cases.
37
This standard requires a probability of approximately ninety percent or higher. 38 Thus, this standard allocates almost all of the risk of error to the government, not only because the rights at stake in criminal cases are of a "transcending value," but also because of society's utmost interest in the correct adjudication of our criminal laws. 39 Notably, this standard is commonly assumed to apply in criminal proceedings only; however, it is applied in some civil proceedings too, such as when deciding 32 39. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24 ("In a criminal case, . . . the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment."); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ("There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
petitions for civil commitment and in delinquency proceedings against juveniles. 40 Between the preponderance and the reasonable doubt standards is the "clear and convincing" standard. 41 As the Supreme Court has observed, the formulation of this standard varies; it "usually employs some combination of the words 'clear,' 'cogent,' 'unequivocal' and 'convincing [.] In re Winship, the Court applied the 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' standard to a civil proceeding for the first time, citing the substantial deprivation of liberty as a major factor in doing so. The reasonable doubt standard has since been adopted by many jurisdictions for deciding civil commitment cases." (citations omitted)).
41. Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("This is a greater burden than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applicable in most civil trials, but less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials").
42. 
C. The Outliers
In addition to the three standards above, additional evidentiary standards of proof exist; however, these standards have been either ignored in standards of proof literature or characterized as variations of one of the three core standards. For example, "substantial, credible" evidence is a standard of proof courts employ in some administrative law actions and in disputed citizenship hearings made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b)(5)(B).
47
This standard is usually a standard of review. 48 However, courts, including the Supreme Court, have employed it as a standard of proof and have found it requires only "more than a mere scintilla," which is less proof than required by the preponderance standard. 49 Similarly, the "strong-basis-in-evidence" standard also requires less proof than the preponderance standard.
50
The Supreme Court first announced this standard in Ricci v. DeStefano, a Title VII employment law case, in 2009. 51 Notably, one scholar has argued that this standard represents a new standard of proof in civil cases. 52 Finally, immigration courts routinely apply the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard, the focus of this Article. Immigration judges employ this standard to determine whether an individual is a removable "alien," whether a lawful permanent resident is inadmissible, and whether a person absent from his final removal hearing was provided adequate notice of his removal hearing. in contrast to the "clear and convincing" standard's required probability of seventy percent, the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard requires a probability of approximately eighty percent or greater.
54
Commentators, however, uniformly assume that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard is simply another formulation of the "clear and convincing" standard.
55
This Article's analysis of this standard therefore fills a gap in literature.
D. The Proven Importance of a Standard's Formulation
Existing standards of proof scholarship and empirical research both show that the words the Supreme Court uses to explain the standard of proof are significant for two reasons.
56
As a starting point, the Supreme Court's original formulation of a standard-rather than its subsequent, simplified formulations of that standard-is essential to determining what degree of proof the Court intended for that standard to require.
57
For example, when originally enunciating the reasonable doubt standard, the Court commonly added the following dependent clauses to explain the meaning of "reasonable doubt": "not a vague conjecture," "'not a capricious and speculative doubt," "not an arbitrary doubt," "not a trivial doubt," "not a mere possible doubt," and "not an imaginary doubt." 58 Over time, however, the meaning of reasonable doubt has been sufficiently established in American jurisprudence, and consequently, the Court no longer uses these dependent clauses, referring to the standard simply as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
59
This illustrates not only that a standard's formulation may evolve over time-even when the requisite degree of belief does not-but also that the dependent clauses the Court uses to explain a standard are vital to understanding its originally intended stringency.
Empirical studies also show that the formulation of a standard affects the outcome of a case. For example, in the most recent study on the impact The study found that the addition of this special jury instruction counterintuitively lowered the standard of proof required, making it statistically indistinguishable from the preponderance standard-the very standard the Court rejected in i4i. 61 Therefore, this study, like others before it, concluded that the formulation of a standard makes a "substantial impact" on factfinders' decisions.
62
Given that accurate formulations of a standard may impact the outcome of the case, it necessarily follows that inaccurate formulations may as well.
III. REASONABLE DOUBT'S CIVIL COUNTERPART: IMMIGRATION LAW'S "CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL, AND CONVINCING" STANDARD Part II established that standards of proof serve an important function in our legal system by signaling to the trier of fact the value society has placed on the correctness of the case's outcome. It also demonstrated that courts already employ at least four standards of proof in civil matters, and that the formulation of a standard significantly impacts the outcome of case.
This Part further challenges the belief that there are only two civil standards of proof. It argues that immigration law's "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard signifies a third civil standard of proof. Because the Supreme Court's original formulation and explanation of a standard illuminates the intended stringency of a standard, this Part traces the evolution of the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard from its original to current formulations. This Part then analyzes the two circuit court opinions analyzing whether this standard is different than the intermediate, "clear and convincing" standard of proof. And because the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") codifies both the "clear and convincing" and "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" formulations, Part concludes with analysis on how canons of statutory interpretation resolve the question of whether these are different standards of proof.
A. Origins of the Standard
What is now the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard familiar to immigration law originated in a series of U.S. Supreme Court denaturalization cases in the 1940s. 64 In those cases, the Court consistently described this standard as the civil equivalent of criminal law's reasonable doubt standard. 65 The Court has never described the "clear and convincing" standard in this manner, which strongly indicates the Court intended for immigration law's "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard to signify a standard higher than that required of the "clear and convincing" standard.
66
As background, the denaturalization cases that established this standard occurred in the post-World War I to World War II era, a time when Americans viewed foreignness, immigrants, and viewpoints running contrary to the status quo more harshly than usual; even Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany were unwelcome.
67
This animosity manifested into political pressure that led the government to initiate denaturalization proceedings against countless naturalized citizens who held "unfavorable" political views.
68
This included William Schneiderman, a Russian-born, naturalized U.S. citizen who avidly supported Nazism and Communism. 69 As it had in other denaturalization proceedings, the government claimed Mr. Schneiderman's controversial political views rendered him "disloyal" and therefore he had fraudulently or illegally procured his naturalization decree.
70
Because immigration statutes did not address what the government's standard of proof was in denaturalization proceedings, the judiciary resolved this question.
71
Lower courts required the government prove fraudulent procurement by a preponderance. 72 In Schneiderman v. United States, however, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the preponderance standard was too low given the "precious right of citizenship" that is at stake in denaturalization proceedings. 73 Also driving the Court's decision was its concern that through these denaturalization proceedings, naturalized citizens were being denied their First Amendment right to freedom of thought, which the natural-born citizenry freely enjoyed. 74 The Court further reasoned that in other fraudulent procurement cases, the government's burden was higher than "a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt." 75 Consequently, Justice Murphy, writing for the majority, announced that in denaturalization proceedings, the government must meet a "heavy" and "exacting" burden by providing "'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt." 76 Two subsequent Supreme Court cases further illuminate the degree of belief the Schneiderman standard of proof requires. First, in Knauer v. United States, the Court described the government's standard in denaturalization proceedings as requiring evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt"-the standard used in criminal proceedings. 77 Specifically, the Court noted that in the underlying denaturalization proceedings, the lower courts found the government proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Knauer fraudulently procured his denaturalization decree. And after evaluating the evidence, the Court held "the two lower courts were correct in their conclusions. The standard of proof, not satisfied in either the Schneiderman or Baumgartner cases, is therefore plainly met here." 80 Notably, the Court did not state that the reasonable doubt standard was a higher standard than Schneiderman required. 81 To the contrary, a fivesentence concurring opinion in Knauer cites the reasonable doubt standard-twice. 82 And the dissenting Justices-one of whom was Justice Murphy, the author of the Schneiderman majority opinion-remained silent regarding the Knauer majority's analysis of the Schneiderman standard, dissenting on other grounds. 83 In a second case, Klapprott v. United States, decided just six years after Schneiderman, the Court issued a plurality opinion that again described the Schneiderman standard as requiring evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 84 The issue in Klapprott was whether a naturalized citizen could be denaturalized through a default judgment. 85 The Court held it could not-not only "because of the grave consequences incident to denaturalization proceedings," but also because the government must prove its case "by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt," a burden not satisfied by the defendant simply defaulting. 86 Importantly, the Court further explained, "[t]his burden is substantially identical with that required in criminal casesproof beyond a reasonable doubt." 87 Similarly, in a separate concurrence, which Justice Murphy joined, Justice Rutledge observed that "the Schneiderman decision . . . required a burden of proof for denaturalization which in effect approximates the burden demanded for conviction in criminal cases, namely, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged as cause for denaturalization." 92. Though the Court effectively ended disloyalty denaturalization litigation, this was not without pushback from Congress. See Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, supra note 70, at 723; see also Fontana, supra note 67, at 68 ("Schneiderman prevented the potential denaturalization of hundreds of thousands of Americans."). For example, in 1950, Congress enacted the Internal Security Act ("ISA") in an attempt to circumvent these precedents with a burden-shifting framework. Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, supra note 70, at 723. The ISA provided that if, within five years of naturalization, a naturalized citizen affiliated with an organization whose prior association would have prevented his naturalization, a presumption would arise that the naturalized citizen had not attached to the principles of the Constitution and therefore obtained his naturalization decree by fraud. Id. The burden would then shift to the naturalized citizen; if he did not rebut this presumption, the government's prima facie evidence would establish fraudulent or illegal procurement of a naturalization decree. Id. This burden-shifting framework was incorporated into the Nationality Act of 1952 and still exists in the current INA. The Court also consistently explained that this standard of proof was akin to the reasonable doubt standard. 95 But that trend shifted, beginning with Woodby v. INS, when the Court adopted an abbreviated formulation of the Schneiderman standard for deportation proceedings. 96 As background, in Woodby, the lower courts required the government provide "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence" of a noncitizen's deportability.
97
These courts had derived this standard from two provisions of the INA: first, section 106(a)(4), which stated that a deportation order shall be conclusive "if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole," and second, section 242(b)(4), which stated that "no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence."
98
The Woodby court, however, found these statutory provisions addressed the judicial standard of review, not the government's standard of proof in deportation proceedings.
99
In deciding which standard the government should meet, the Court rejected the reasonable doubt standard, has never been tested, as it has never been the sole ground upon which the government sought to denaturalize a citizen. Consequently, the Court held that government must meet Schneiderman's requirement of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence in deportation proceedings.
102
Although the Court explicitly cited Schneiderman and adopted its standard, the Court did not include Schneiderman's dependent clause, that the evidence should "not leave the issue in doubt," nor did the Court describe it as being akin to the reasonable doubt standard, as it previous had in the denaturalization context. 103 Still, it did note that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard-or "an even higher" standardwas "no stranger" to civil law. 104 Thus, the Court in Woodby clearly observed that there is a higher civil standard of proof than the intermediate, "clear and convincing" standard.
Following this decision, lower courts applied and federal regulations incorporated Woodby's abbreviated version of the Schneiderman standard, requiring the government prove deportability with the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, rather than the longer formulation articulated in Schneiderman.
105
But as discussed below, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) not only changed the applicability of this standard, it also codified several new standards of proof and modified key terminology.
Turning first to terminology, prior to IIRIRA, the INA provided for "exclusion" and "deportation" proceedings.
106
The type of proceeding depended on where the noncitizen was apprehended.
107
If a noncitizen were apprehended at the port of entry, he would be placed in "exclusion" proceedings for being " apprehended inside the U.S. interior, he would be placed in "deportation" proceedings for either being "deportable" or "inadmissible."
109 IIRIRA, however, combined "exclusion" and "deportation" proceedings into "removal" proceedings, yet it retained the two grounds for removability. 110 Thus, today, a noncitizen is removable for being "deportable"-that is, he was previously admitted into the United States, but is now "deportable" under INA § 237(a) for being in violation of the law-or "inadmissible"-that is, he either entered the United States without being admitted or sought to enter the United States without proper travel documents and is therefore "inadmissible" under section 212(a).
111
IIRIRA also made the following four changes to the standards of proof in the INA:
First, Congress now requires "clear and convincing" evidence of a noncitizen's deportability.
112
This essentially cabined Woodby's applicability to noncitizens charged with deportability.
113
Hence, where federal regulation incorporated the Woodby standard pre-1997, the regulation now requires the IIRIRA "clear and convincing" standard in establishing deportability. 114 Second, in absentia removal proceedings (in which the noncitizen does not appear at his final removal hearing), Congress requires the government to provide "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence that written notice of the removal hearing was provided and that the noncitizen is removable. 115 Thus, in absentia proceedings, Congress codified the Woodby standard for proceedings in which a noncitizen is absent, regardless of whether that noncitizen is charged with being removable due to inadmissibly or deportability.
Third, noncitizens in removal proceedings must prove their admissibility "clearly and beyond doubt." Thus, the INA contemplates four standards of proof for immigration proceedings.
Currently, neither the INA nor agency regulations address all applicable standards of proof in removal proceedings. For example, although case law and agency regulations require the government to prove the alienage of an allegedly inadmissible noncitizen, there is no statute or regulation that specifies the government's requisite standard of proof.
118
To fill this gap, courts apply the Woodby standard, requiring the government to provide "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence of alienage. 119 Recently, two circuit courts were presented the question of whether the Woodby standard is simply another formulation for the intermediate, "clear and convincing" standard, or whether it is an "even higher" standard. Those decisions are analyzed below.
C. The Circuit Split
This section explores two circuit courts' analysis of whether "clear and convincing" evidence is a different standard than Woodby's "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. Several considerations stemming from the prior sections' history of the standard will guide this analysis.
First, what is the most accurate way for courts to frame this legal issue? Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits framed it as a question of whether the omission of "unequivocal" from the Woodby version of the Schneiderman standard creates a standard different than the intermediate, "clear and convincing" standard.
120
But Woodby clearly adopted Schneiderman, and also noted that deportation creates an even greater hardship than denaturalization. Thus, the more precise way to frame this issue would be to compare the entire Schneiderman standard-""clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that does not leave the issue in 118. Agency regulations state only that in removal proceedings, the government must first prove the alienage of the noncitizen. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2017) ("In the case of a respondent charged as being in the United States without being admitted or paroled, the Service must first establish the alienage of the respondent.").
119. doubt"-with the "clear and convincing" standard. This would ensure that courts consider the context in which the Court has employed the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard-to protect a supremely precious right: the right of citizenship and presence in this country; the right to have constitutional rights-an essential function of a standard of proof. But by comparing the truncated Woodby standard, one necessarily ignores the important societal concerns considered in Schneiderman and Woodby. This greatly dilutes the important role standards of proof are meant to play in our legal system. Second, even if courts ignore Schneiderman's dependent clause that explains what "unequivocal" means, does the addition of the word "unequivocal" to the formulation make a difference to the stringency of the standard? And finally, given that Congress codified both the "clear and convincing" and "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" formulations in the INA, how do canons of statutory interpretation direct courts to resolve whether these standards are satisfied by different degrees of belief? These considerations are explored below.
Ward v. Holder
The question of where on the continuum of proof the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard lays was first addressed in Ward v. Holder, a Sixth Circuit case from 2013. 121 There, a lawful permanent resident left the United States for three years to care for his ailing mother in the United Kingdom.
122
When he returned to the United States, he presented his green card, which had expired, and as a result, immigration officials placed him in removal proceedings on inadmissibility grounds under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). 123 The immigration court found that under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3), the government was required to provide "clear and convincing" evidence that Ward had abandoned his lawful permanent resident status and was therefore inadmissible. 124 The Sixth Circuit, however, found that the immigration judge's reliance on section 1229a(c)(3)'s "clear and convincing" standard was incorrect because that section applies to proving a noncitizen is "deportable," not "inadmissible," as Ward was charged with. the court found the correct evidentiary standard for proving inadmissibility due to abandonment of lawful permanent residence status is "clear, unequivocal, and convincing," as established by Sixth Circuit precedent.
126
The court then analyzed whether the immigration judge's omission of the word "unequivocal" from its standard formulation was an error. 127 The court found that it was, based on Addington v. Texas.
128
There, the Supreme Court considered what degree of proof is required to satisfy due process "in a civil proceeding . . . to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital." 129 The trial court had applied the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard, the court of appeals had applied the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, and the Texas Supreme Court had applied the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
130
The Supreme Court held that "clear and convincing" evidence satisfied due process.
131
But because the trial court had required "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, the Court remanded to the Texas Supreme Court and directed it to decide whether Texas law requires a "burden equal to or greater than the 'clear and convincing' standard" required to satisfy due process.
132
Based on Addington, Ward found that the omission of "unequivocal" from the standard formulation does makes a difference, and consequently held that "[t]he 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard' is a more demanding degree of proof than the 'clear and convincing' standard." 133 Notably, this is the same conclusion the BIA reached, albeit without analysis, in Matter of Patel in 1988. 134 126. Id. at 607 ("The Immigration Judge could not have relied upon another section of the Act, because the Act nowhere specifies the standard of proof in cases in which the government has alleged that a lawful permanent resident is inadmissible because he or she has abandoned his or her lawful permanent resident status. Instead, the applicable degree of proof-'''to establish by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence' that Ward's status had changed-comes from case law; in our Circuit." (citing Hana v. Gonzales There, the government had placed Reynaldo Mondaca in removal proceedings on inadmissibility grounds. 136 Mondaca, however, claimed to be a U.S. citizen by birth, which the government had repeatedly confirmed prior to initiating his removal proceedings; for example, it had issued him a U.S. passport, twice, and recognized his foreign-born children as U.S. citizens based on his status as a U.S. citizen.
137
In his removal proceedings, however, the government claimed Mondaca was actually Salvador Mondaca-Vega, a Mexican citizen.
138
The flashpoint issue in the case, therefore, was whether the government had established Mondaca-Vega's alienage. 139 Ninth Circuit case law has established that the government must prove "alienage"-an element of "inadmissibility" and an immigration judge's basis for jurisdiction 140 -with "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. 141 However, the lower court in Mondaca-Vega required only "clear and convincing" evidence of alienage. "unequivocal" from the standard was an error. 144 But unlike Ward, the Mondaca-Vega court concluded the two lower courts had not erred, finding the "clear and convincing" standard requires the same degree of belief as the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard.
145
The court cited several reasons for this conclusion; however, the theme underlying each reason is the court's belief that there are only three standards of proof, and therefore the most stringent standard of proof in civil law is "clear and convincing."
146
For example, the court found it "implausible" that "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" could signify a fourth burden of proof-"something between clear and convincing evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt"-because the Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized that there are three burdens of proof . . . ."
147
But as previously noted, and as a dissenting judge in Mondaca-Vega observed, the Supreme Court "has never suggested that standards of proof are limited to these three general levels." 148 Rather, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a continuum of proof, in addition to acknowledging that a spectrum exists even within the intermediate standard. 149 Indeed, in Woodby, the Court observed that Schneiderman's "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard-or an "even higher one"-is no stranger to civil law.
150
This alone directly conflicts with Mondaca-Vega's finding that the Supreme Court has found there are only three standards of proof.
Mondaca-Vega also conflicts with Addington. There, as previously noted, the Supreme Court held that the "clear and convincing" evidence was the standard required to satisfy due process in involuntary commitment proceedings.
151
And because the trial court had required "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, the Court remanded to the Texas Supreme Court and directed it to decide whether Texas law requires a "burden equal to or greater than the 'clear and convincing' standard" Thus, if there were only three standards of proof as Mondaca-Vega found, the Court in Addington would have had no reason to leave it to the Texas Supreme Court to determine whether to adopt the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard applied by the trial court-the two would have been formulations of the same standard. But Addington remanded. 153 And on remand, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the "clear and convincing" standard of proof, and held that because the trial court had employed the "stricter" "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard, the trial judge's error was harmless. 154 Moreover, in concluding that there are only three standards, the court in Mondaca-Vega also found that "it defies reason to think that a fourth burden of proof could be meaningfully distinguished and distinctly applied." 155 But as previously noted, empirical research shows otherwise; indeed, research consistently shows that judges can and do distinguish between more than three standards of proof.
156
And even if judges could not, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence is akin to the reasonable doubt standard; therefore, immigration judges would be applying a well-established standard, albeit in the civil context, 157 not a "nebulous" standard that requires the "hair-splitting" the Mondaca-Vega court expressed concern with.
158
To that point, however, the court rejected that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard could be interpreted as meaning "beyond a reasonable doubt," because " [t] 157. In a parenthetical, the court found the reasonable doubt standard could not apply in immigration court, reasoning that "the Court has never required the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard to be applied in a civil case. This unique standard of proof . . . is regarded as a critical part of the moral force of the criminal law." Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 421 (quoting California ex rel. And the court is right; no Supreme Court case has ever stated that the standard for establishing alienage is "beyond a reasonable doubt." But to be sure, a nearly halfcentury long line of Supreme Court cases have consistently described the Schneiderman standard as being the "[civil] equivalent to that enforced in criminal cases," that is, it is "substantially identical with that required in criminal cases-proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 160 Indeed, in Knauer, the Court affirmed the lower court's application of the reasonable doubt standard, clearly equating it to the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard, which the concurring opinion also referred to as requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
161
The Mondaca-Vega court did not address these precedents, perhaps because some are plurality opinions. 162 However, these plurality opinions are still highly persuasive here given their temporal proximity to Schneiderman; indeed, members of the Schneiderman bench were the plurality's authors. And Knauer was a majority opinion. Thus, it is not possible to reconcile Knauer with Mondaca-Vega's finding that the only way a court could require proof beyond a reasonable doubt is by articulating the "beyond a reasonable doubt" formulation.
Finally, Mondaca-Vega compared the Supreme Court's formulation of the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard and concluded that the Court used it interchangeably with the "clear and convincing" standard. 163 As an example of this, the court noted that Baumgartner-a denaturalization case issued less than a year after Schneiderman-required "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, and Pullman-Standard v. Swint, described Baumgartner as deciding "whether or not the findings of the two lower courts satisfied the clear and convincing standard of proof necessary to sustain a denaturalization decree." The court's analysis on this point is misguided for three reasons. First, in its usage comparison, the court did not include the dependent clause that the Court consistently used to explain the meaning of equivocal-proof "that leaves no troubling doubt"-in its analysis. 166 As noted in Part II, scholars have long observed that the Court's use of explanatory phrases is key to understanding the standard's intended stringency, and only after that stringency is well-developed in case law and understood by factfinders are those dependent clauses no longer necessary. 167 Here, however, the dependent clause remains necessary to determining what stringency the Court intended for this standard to demand. Thus, the court's starting point-comparing the truncated formulation of the standard with the "clear and convincing" standard-takes its analysis off course.
Second, as proof that the Court uses the standards interchangeably, Mondaca-Vega cites Pullman-Standard's footnote reference to Baumgartner.
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Pullman-Standard was a Title VII case from the 1980s, while Baumgartner was a denaturalization case from 1945. 169 The issue in both cases was whether the Court could review the lower court's factual findings; the standard of proof was not at issue in Pullman-Standard. 170 Hence, Pullman-Standard referenced Baumgartner's standard of proof only to explain why Baumgartner established that certain factual findings are subject to appellate de novo review, one being that the significance of the exacting Schneiderman standard of proof would be lost if the whole record were deemed a fact not subject to appellate review. analyze and apply the meaning of the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard of proof.
173
This includes Addington-which held the "clear and convincing" standard was the appropriate standard in involuntary commitment cases not "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"-and Knauer-an immigration case that explicitly held that the "reasonable doubt" standard satisfied the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard. 174 Ultimately, Mondaca-Vega's reasoning suggests that the Court's use of an imprecise formulation of the standard in one non-immigration case is owed more weight than the Court's precise and consistent formulation of the standard in numerous other immigration cases. But this logic necessarily ignores one of the key functions a standard serves-to signal to the factfinder the value society places on the right at stake and the accurate outcome of the case. For example, each time the Court enunciated the standard of proof required in these immigration cases, the Court explained why such an "unusually high" standard of proof is required: because the rights at stake are fundamental, and because the consequences of deportation are "unusually drastic" and "extraordinarily severe penalty." 175 The Court has also explained that " [a] when someone who claims he is a citizen is placed in removal proceedings because, with limited exceptions, the Constitution affords no rights to noncitizens who are outside of the United States. 180 Hence, if an immigration judge errantly finds a citizen is an "alien" and he is removed from this country, he is not only stripped of his fundamental right to citizenship, but he is also stripped of all the other rights afforded by the Constitution. His removal therefore forces him to endure these "drastic deprivations," in addition to "forsak[ing] all bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification."
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It is for these reasons that throughout United States history, courts have referred to errant deportation as "a penalty little less dreadful than death."
182
In short, contrary to Mondaca-Vega's reasoning, those whose parental rights are terminated simply do not suffer the same deprivation of rights as citizens who are banished from their home country.
Furthermore, in finding the clear and convincing standard was adequate, the Mondaca-Vega court did not address an additional function that standards serve-the allocation of risk of error among the litigants based on the rights at stake. Citizenship is the bedrock of our Republic; "it is U.S. citizens alone who give the government power." 183 And a key aspect of self-governance requires that the government cannot lightly take away one's citizenship. 184 By allocating almost all of the risk of error to the government to prove the person it seeks to remove from the country is an "alien," not a U.S. citizen, the "clear, unequivocal, and convicing" standard of proof therefore protects the precious right of citizenship and also the structure of our government.
This section has highlighted the many reasons why Mondaca-Vega cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedents, the chief reason 183. FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at *6. 184. Id.
being that the Court has never limited factfinders to three standards of proof. The Court has repeatedly described the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard as the civil equivalent to the reasonable doubt standard, which puts a significant distance between it and the "clear and convincing" standard on the continuum of proof. Courts analyzing this issue in the future should follow this unbroken line of precedents and conclude that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard is more onerous than the "clear and convincing" standard.
D. Statutory Interpretation
The "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" and the "clear and convincing" standards of proof are both codified in the INA. 185 Therefore, courts may be presented with the question of whether these standards of proof are different in either the context of case law precedent, as both the Ward and Mondaca-Vega courts were, or in the context of statutory construction. This section analyzes how courts should resolve this issue under the guidance of canons of statutory interpretation. Importantly, this analysis is relevant to both contexts this question may arise in; the conclusion a court reaches necessarily impacts the issue in both the case law and statutory interpretation contexts.
The "starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
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Courts therefore assign the plain meaning to every word of the statute at issue.
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To determine the plain meaning, canons of statutory construction instruct "the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those words." Here, applying these rules of construction show that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard is different than the "clear and convincing" standard. Turning first to the statutory language. In 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A), Congress requires "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence that the noncitizen to being ordered removed in absentia was served with written notice and that the noncitizen is removable. contrast, in section 1229a(c)(3)(A), Congress requires the government to provide "clear and convincing" evidence that the person it seeks to remove is a deportable noncitizen.
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Because Congress used different words within the statute to describe the government's requisite standard of proof for different types of proceedings, Congress therefore must have intended to convey different standards of proof. 192 To determine the intended stringency of these two standards, a court must determine the plain meaning of "unequivocal." The INA does not define this term.
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The Supreme Court, however, has: "The term 'unequivocal,' taken by itself, means proof that admits of no doubt, a burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in criminal cases." 194 Given that the Court announced this definition prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, courts are to presume Congress was aware of the meaning of unequivocal when it incorporated it into the INA. 195 Thus, Congress intended for the government to meet a higher standard-one that requires "unequivocal" evidence-when seeking to remove someone who is absent from her removal hearing compared to when it seeks to remove someone who is present. This conclusion is bolstered when considering the core function of a standard of proof-to allocate the risk of error based on importance of the rights at stake. And in absentia removal proceedings, not only are the precious rights of citizenship and presence in this country potentially at stake, so are the absent individual's due process rights to a full and fair hearing.
To conclude otherwise-that is, to conclude that Congress intended for these two standards to carry the same meaning-would require a court to write the word "unequivocal" out of the statute. This would, however, violate the cardinal rule to give meaning to every word in the statute. 196 This would also invert the purpose of a standard of proof. That is, the standard of proof would not safeguard the additional rights at stake in an individual's absentia removal proceedings; instead, the same burden of proof (and allocation of risk) would apply regardless of whether the noncitizen is present. This result is untenable.
Mondaca-Vega, appear to view this standard as requiring "highly probable" evidence of alienage at best. 200 This misunderstanding of the standard's stringency causes severe, often irreparable consequences.
It is not known with certainty how often the government detains and deports U.S. citizens, largely because it goes unreported. 201 Still, the empirical research of Northwestern professor Jacqueline Stevens and the statements of numerous immigration experts all indicate that the U.S. government detains and deports citizens on a regular basis. 202 Stevens' research, for example, suggests that in 2010, "well over 4,000 U.S. citizens were detained or deported as aliens, raising the total since 2003 to more than 20,000." 203 Though this research is anecdotal, and even Stevens acknowledges that this "figure that may strike some as so high as to lack credibility," numerous other sources, including immigrant rights nonprofits and immigration experts, agree with Stevens' findings. 204 In 2008, for example, immigration expert Kara Hartzler testified to Congress that "U.S. citizens are being detained and deported from the United States not monthly or weekly, but on a daily basis." 205 Hartzler also testified that she saw "40 to 50 cases per month in which individuals with potentially valid claims to U.S. citizenship [we]re being detained and deported." 206 
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Thomas was born in Minnesota. 208 He has a mental illness and heroin addiction. 209 After he was arrested on a minor drug charge, he told officers that he was a Russian army colonel who was shot and stabbed in Afghanistan and that he swam to America from a Russian submarine. 210 Thomas was then placed in removal proceedings.
211
Based on this testimony, the immigration judge found the government proved Thomas' alienage with "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence, and he was transferred to an immigration detention facility in Florence, Arizona.
212
Thomas began "working in the prison kitchen for a dollar a day until he had the money to order [a copy of his U.S. birth certificate]," which he eventually obtained and used to prove his citizenship with Hartzler's help. 213 Peter Guzman, a U.S. citizen born in California who has limited mental capacity, was not able to avoid deportation. 214 In 2007, he was incarcerated for 40 days on a trespassing charge, during which immigration officials "interviewed him and asked if he was a citizen"-despite having records of his citizenship. 215 Peter repeatedly told them he was a U.S. citizen. 216 He also "complained of hearing voices while in custody, and was prescribed anti-psychotic medication." 217 Eventually, Peter agreed to the agents' insistence that he was actually born in Mexico, like his parents were. 218 After Peter signed a voluntary departure order, he was placed on a bus with $3 and taken to Tijuana. 219 There, he survived for three months by eating out of garbage cans.
in the closet-sized backroom of a banana warehouse, where she was allowed to stay in exchange for cooking for the warehouse workers . . . ."
221
Mark Lyttle, whose errant deportation to Mexico was discussed in the Introduction, Thomas, and Peter's experiences are indicative of the demographic of people who are most susceptible to errant detention and deportation: They belong to racial and ethnic minorities, or are mentally ill, homeless, or indigent.
222
By employing a standard of proof that requires "unequivocal" evidence of alienage-evidence that does not leave the issue of alienage "in doubt"-rather than evidence of alienage that is only "highly probable," the occurrence of the U.S. government's detention and deportation of its citizens would decrease, likely dramatically. This higher standard would also signal to the government that more compelling proof of alienage is required; this too would likely curtail the government's initial placement of citizens in removal proceedings. Also, requiring a standard greater than "clear and convincing" would further safeguard the rights of the vulnerable populations who are most often errantly detained and deported. Further, given that alienage determinations are subject to limited review on appeal, a heightened standard protects the precious right of citizenship that is at stake. 223 Finally, a more onerous standard of proof that allocates almost all of the risk of error to the government to prove the individual is an "alien" would signal to the factfinder how supremely important it is to society that judges order only noncitizens removed. For these reasons, immigration courts should view the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard as requiring higher proof of alienage than the "clear and convincing" standard.
224

B. The Implicit Biases of Immigration Judges
Requiring "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence of alienage-that is, evidence that does not leave the issue in doubt-will further protect the countless, vulnerable citizens errantly placed in removal 224. These reasons also underscore why immigration judges should regard this standard as requiring heightened proof when ordering an individual removed in absentia under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2012).
proceedings from the well-documented implicit biases of immigration judges.
Implicit biases-also termed "hidden" and "unconscious" biases-are "bits of knowledge" our brains store about social groups after having frequently encountered them.
225
"Once lodged in our minds, hidden biases can influence our behavior toward members of particular social groups, but we remain oblivious to their influence." 226 For example, "[w]hen the brain has to process large volumes of information quickly, there is a tendency to rely on experiences rather than on unique details in the present." 227 When judging people in this strained state, the brain falls back on the "bits of knowledge" it has stored regarding generalizations about race, age, country of origin, religion or gender, rather than evaluating that particular individual. 228 Thus, implicit bias against groups of people is subjective, "largely automatic, and occurs below the level of conscious awareness," making it difficult for the individual harboring the bias to identify and nearly impossible for others to identify. 229 Indeed, even though we all harbor implicit biases, "most people find it unbelievable that their behavior can be guided by mental content of which they are unaware." 230 Research shows that in judicial decision-making, most judges are able to suppress their implicit biases, which prevents bias from clouding their decisions. 231 But this is not necessarily true of immigration judges, largely due to the conditions that immigration judges work under-"fast paced, high pressure and culturally charged." 232 Experts say that these conditions, coupled with the fact high cognitive loads yield more mistakes make misjudgments "all but inevitable." 233 In 2011, Professor Fatma Marouf examined the effect of implicit bias on immigration judges and the BIA. 234 Drawing on her novel research, she concluded that immigration judges are especially prone to implicit bias because they: (1) do not have the "structural and professional norms to remain impartial and independent"; (2) have limited opportunities to engage in deliberate thinking; (3) have low motivation resulting from high levels of stress and burnout; (4) must decide legally and factually complex cases; and (5) make decisions that are often subjected to limited review by the BIA and federal courts of appeal.
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Each of these factors further highlights the need for imposing a heightened evidentiary burden on the government when establishing alienage.
First, the structure of immigration judgeships raises concerns over immigration judges' ability to be impartial and independent. Unlike federal judges who derive their authority from Article III of the Constitution and enjoy the independence that accompanies a lifetime appointment, almost all immigration judges are appointed after serving long careers within the Department of Justice, prosecuting immigration cases. 236 And even as immigration judges, their autonomy remains inhibited; immigration judges still answer to the Attorney General who appointed them.
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In addition to lacking genuine independence, immigration judges are permitted to interrogate, examine, and crossexamine witnesses. 238 Thus, with over forty percent of individuals in removal unrepresented, 239 an immigration judge can easily abuse his or her authority.
An immigration judge's neutrality is especially worrisome "when one considers that respondents in removal proceedings do not have any of the protections against bias that characterize criminal trials, such as voir dire and peremptory strikes, although deportation is akin to criminal punishment in its severity." 240 And as Marouf correctly notes, "[t]he lack of genuine independence of [immigration judges], coupled with their inquisitorial role, creates a situation where the guidelines for appropriate behavior are unclear, which allows implicit bias to go unchecked and contributes to discrimination in deciding cases." Furthermore, when an individual's implicit and explicit beliefs conflict, the implicit belief becomes the "default," and the explicit belief can override the implicit only if the individual has the cognitive capacity available to do so. 242 And given that immigration judges are extremely overworked, they face severe burnout, low motivation, exhaustion, and even depression. 243 An average immigration judge handles over 1,800 cases per year, more than three times the average caseload of federal judges. 244 Some immigration judges have as many as 6,000 cases each. 245 One judge on the Arlington Immigration Court is described as having to decide twenty-six cases before lunch-spending only seven minutes per case. 246 And this is actually an improvement. 247 Because immigration law itself is known to be extremely complex in nature-both legally and factually-these conditions that immigration judges must decide cases in "all encourage reliance on intuition, rather than conscious, deliberative thought, which takes more time and energy," making it harder, if not impossible, to suppress implicit bias. 248 This is especially true in the context of discretionary decisions, such as credibility, which are subject to extremely limited review by the BIA and circuit court. 249 evidence of an individual's alleged alienage, the burden shifts to the individual to provide evidence of citizenship. 250 But if the judge does not find the individual credible, his citizenship evidence is severely discounted. 251 Thus, a judge's alienage finding often rests on the individual's credibility, not on the sufficiency of the government's evidence. 252 And on appeal, the immigration judge's credibility finding is protected by the deferential "clear error" standard of review. 253 These factors all make immigration judges particularly susceptible to implicit bias. 254 Indeed, numerous case studies and court decisions confirm that implicit bias is a problem particularly among the immigration bench. 255 And in the context of alienage determinations, an immigration judge's implicit bias can create in an insurmountable hurdle for a citizen, especially if that citizen is unrepresented, a minority, or mentally ill. 256 Therefore, by requiring the government to prove alienage with "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence-a more onerous standard than the "clear and convincing" standard-the rights of U.S. citizens errantly placed in removal proceedings will more adequately safeguarded from these implicit biases, thereby reducing the occurrence of deported U.S. citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article challenged the widely held belief that there are only three standards of proof-two for civil proceedings, and one for criminal. It analyzed immigration law's "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard under Supreme Court precedent, statutory interpretation, and policy considerations. From this, the Article concluded that the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard signifies a third civil standard of proof, one that is more stringent than the intermediate "clear and convincing" standard. Thus, this Article represents an initial effort to reshape the existing view of standards of proof; rather than restricting factfinders to a defined set of standards of proof, courts and scholars should be guided by the Supreme Court's emphasis that standards of proof exist on a continuum.
